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assessments of each model suggest that the economic growth of both countries has been 
relatively stagnant. Many theories address possible causes of their stagnation, but the 
prospect of premature deindustrialization has received little attention. Could premature 
deindustrialization be a source of economic stagnation in Brazil and Mexico, and if so, 
how can these two cases help developing countries avoid potential economic pitfalls? 
A comparison of Brazil and Mexico’s past trade agreements, policies, and 
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reforms. Since opening their economies to the global markets, the two countries have 
followed vastly different trajectories, yet both continue to experience economic 
stagnation. This thesis takes a close look into each country, highlighting trends that have 
led each state to experience premature deindustrialization. 
The thesis concludes that both Brazil and Mexico have experienced premature 
deindustrialization, albeit in different forms and for distinctive reasons. The findings of 
this thesis are intended to spur further research into deindustrialization as a possible cause 
of economic stagnation in the two largest economies of Latin America. The results could 
prove helpful to developing neighbors in the region. 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO DEINDUSTRIALIZATION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Brazil and Mexico are often studied as opposing models of neoliberal reform, yet 
assessments of each model suggest that the economic growth of both countries has been 
relatively stagnant. Many theories address possible causes of their stagnation, but the 
prospect of premature deindustrialization has received little attention. Could premature 
deindustrialization be a source of economic stagnation in Brazil and Mexico, and if so, 
how can these two cases help developing countries avoid potential economic pitfalls?   
De-industrialization alone is not a threat to a state; the process can demonstrate a 
healthy economic trajectory when a country slowly shifts from a manufacturing-centered 
economy to a service-based economy. However, if a country begins the transition to the 
service sector before the economy can sustain it, the results can have negative effects on 
growth, causing the economy to stagnate.1 The scope of this thesis is to explore de-
industrialization, examine the root causes of the phenomenon, and determine whether the 
process is negatively affecting the political economies of Brazil and Mexico. A 
comparative analysis of the countries’ different paths of economic development assists in 
determining whether Brazil and Mexico are experiencing de-industrialization, and for 
what reasons.  
Brazil and Mexico share many similarities that justify their use in this 
comparative analysis. Both are large states that rank highest in population and gross 
domestic product (GDP) among Latin American countries. Both are rich in natural 
resources and showcase diverse economies with Brazil having the seventh largest in GDP 
in the world, while Mexico is fourteenth according to the 2013 World Bank rankings.2
Despite high degrees of inequality in income distribution, the pair are considered middle-
income countries, meaning that their per-capita income is not at the levels of advanced 
1 Dani Rodrik, “The Perils of Premature Deindustrialization,” Project Syndicate, October 11, 2013, 3, 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dani-rodrikdeveloping-economies--missing-manufacturing. 
2 The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014 (2013 GDP Ranking), last modified July 1,
2014, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf.  
 2 
economies, but each state is better off than the developing countries found in Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia.3 Brazil and Mexico also share similar historical backgrounds; 
both have been independent nation states since the early 1800s and experienced periods 
of considerable economic success under the era of import substitution industrialization. In 
the 1980s and the 1990s, Brazil and Mexico underwent neoliberal reforms, each selecting 
a different path toward globalization of their economies. While Mexico fully embraced 
economic openness with foreign trade agreements and foreign direct investments (FDI), 
Brazil maintained a relatively closed stance and instead pursued a role of regional 
leadership.4 Despite the different paths taken, both economies have struggled to achieve 
the GDP growth rates experienced prior to neoliberal reforms; many say the economies 
are stagnant (See Figure 1). The similar stagnant economic performances, despite 
different paths since neoliberal reforms, make Brazil and Mexico an interesting duo for 
comparison. This thesis analyzes the paths of both states and offers a possible explanation 
for the similar stagnant outcome—deindustrialization.   
                                                 
3 Angus Maddison, Brazil and Mexico—The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth, 
Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), vii, 4, 
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=477894&piPK=64165421
&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000178830_9810191113027. 
4 Peter Hakim, “Two Ways to Go Global,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 148, 
doi:10.2307/20033009. 
3 
Figure 1.  GDP Growth 2004–2013 (Annual Percentage).5 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of this thesis is two-fold. First and foremost, deindustrialization is 
a topic that receives little attention in the literature of Brazil and Mexico’s economic 
growth performance, yet literature on deindustrialization confirms that if the process 
occurs prematurely, economic stagnation can occur. In hopes of spurring further research, 
this thesis offers the explanation that deindustrialization is a causal factor of economic 
stagnation in Brazil and Mexico. Second, this thesis offers a comparative perspective that 
may reveal trends in models of economic development that could prove useful to other 
developing nations. Understanding the different paths of Brazil and Mexico may reveal 
specific pitfalls that lead to deindustrialization, which developing nations could avoid. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
The most prominent issue that the research question presents is determining 
whether premature deindustrialization is affecting the economies of both Brazil and 
Mexico. If each state is experiencing the phenomenon, then determining the extent of 
5 Chart from The World Bank, World Development Indicators 2014 (Brazil and Mexico GDP Growth
2004–2013), accessed August 3, 2014, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/BR-MX?display=graph. 
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each case is also a challenge due to the different styles of neoliberal reform.  Finding 
similarities in the distinctive paths along with highlighting problem areas is useful in 
explaining possible causes of economic stagnation and can also be viewed as valuable 
data that developing countries may use when planning for economic success.  
There are three preliminary hypotheses that can be derived from the research 
question. The first hypothesis is that Mexico and Brazil are both experiencing de-
industrialization at a premature rate, which, in turn, is contributing to the economic 
stagnation of each country. If this is the case, then it is important to highlight the 
differences in each circumstance for comparative analysis. Seeking out dissimilarities in 
each case between standard circumstances of traditional deindustrialization and unique 
circumstances of an individual instance helps to clarify potential trends. Finding enough 
commonalities that would project a possible trend of similar causes of de-
industrialization in both countries is improbable, as the two countries have taken different 
paths in terms of domestic policy, international policy, and trade agreements. 
Additionally, each country has vastly different characteristics in areas such as resources, 
export specialization, industrial make-up, and infrastructure. If the hypothesis is 
successfully argued that both Brazil and Mexico are experiencing premature 
deindustrialization, the likely outcome is that the cause, type, and extent of the 
phenomenon vary greatly. Proving this hypothesis would not only help to explain 
economic stagnation in each country, but would also provide useful information to 
developing countries in avoiding economic pitfalls. 
Another possibility is that only one country is experiencing deindustrialization 
prematurely. If this is the case, then deindustrialization becomes less of a factor in 
explaining economic stagnation for the case studies, yet, the analysis of each state’s path 
to neoliberal reforms becomes dominant in determining economic pitfalls and successes.  
If one state proves to have made better economic decisions throughout the reform 
process, piloting the country away from deindustrializing, then state actions become more 
apparent examples for developing countries to follow. The value of a comparative 
analysis in this sense becomes less focused on trends as it will simply become a case of 
analyzing opposing styles of reform. 
 5 
The last hypothesis is that Mexico and Brazil are not encountering premature de-
industrialization. Some scholars offer other reasons for economic stagnation, and do not 
acknowledge any occurrence of premature deindustrialization in Brazil or Mexico.6  It is 
the goal of this thesis to disprove this hypothesis and show that both countries are 
encountering the phenomenon.  
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis incorporates multiple methods of analysis; the research includes 
scholarly theories, government documents, and statistical trends from primary sources. 
Primarily, the thesis is a comparative analysis of contemporary political and economic 
circumstances in Brazil and Mexico. To accomplish the comparative analysis 
successfully, a case study of each state is included. The case studies consist of recent 
historical analysis concerning policies and trade agreements, and statistical analysis of 
economic trends. Additionally, an overview of causal theories of de-industrialization is 
necessary in order to frame the analytical argument for each state. The causal theories of 
de-industrialization are applied to each case study in order to illustrate and highlight any 
contributory factors of deindustrialization within each country. If theoretical application 
is successful in each case, the comparative analysis between the two countries will 
provide further details in areas of similarity and disparity along their paths of economic 
development. Looking at the two paths in order to determine pitfalls that each country 
incurred is a valuable asset that can assist other developing countries in avoiding similar 
circumstances.  
                                                 
6 Pedro Luiz Barros Silva, José Carlos de Souza Braga, and Vera Lúcia Cabral Costa,“Lula’s 
Administration at a Crossroads: The Difficult Combination of Stability and Development in Brazil.” In 
Leftist Governments Latin America Successes and Shortcomings, ed Kurt Weyland, Raúl L. Madrid, and 
Wendy Hunter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 124–140; Rhys Jenkins and Alexandre de 
Freitas Barbosa, “Fear for Manufacturing? China and the Future of Industry in Brazil and Latin America,” 
The China Quarterly 209 (29 March 2012): 59–81, doi:10.1017/S0305741011001482; Julio A. Santaella, 
Economic Growth in Mexico: Searching For Clues to Its Slowdown (Washington, DC: Inter-American 
Development Bank, 1998); Shannon K. O’Neil, “Six Markets to Watch: Mexico,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 1 
(2014): 11–16; and Albert Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute 
Press, 2011). 
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E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis begins with an overview of the phenomenon of de-industrialization, to 
include a definition of the process and a survey of five theories of causal analysis. The 
five causal theories of deindustrialization include the following: 1) insufficient 
technology in the industrial sector 2) currency based problems in the economy 3) 
outsourcing of labor 4) North-South relationships 5) the resource curse, or “Dutch 
disease.” Finally, this first section concludes with addressing some of the dangers 
associated with premature de-industrialization. The next section addresses the situation 
that Brazil faces. The chapter begins with a short history of Brazil’s political and 
economic policies, and trade agreements since the opening of their economy to the global 
markets. This chapter also details causal factors in Brazil’s situation and describes the 
type of premature de-industrialization that the economy is encountering. The following 
chapter focuses on Mexico. Detail is given to the history, policies, and trade agreements 
of the Mexican government and economy, especially the NAFTA agreement and how it 
has affected the Mexican economy. This chapter also uses economic statistics, 
highlighting industry trends, GDP growth patterns, and currency trends, to assess 
Mexico’s economic situation as a disguised case of deindustrialization. The final chapter 
is a comparative analysis between the Brazilian and Mexican case studies in order to 
draw together the similarities and differences that the two countries exhibited throughout 
neo-liberal reforms. Deindustrialization in each state is also compared to determine 
whether the phenomenon could be a cause of the economic stagnation that Brazil and 
Mexico are experiencing and also to illustrate the various pitfalls that developing nations 
could possibly avoid. The final chapter also draws conclusions for the issue of premature 




II. DEINDUSTRIALIZATION: DEFINITIONS AND 
THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Before analyzing the situations in Brazil and Mexico to determine whether 
premature deindustrialization could be a possible cause of economic stagnation, it is 
helpful to understand that deindustrialization does not always connote a negative 
economic scenario for a country. Furthermore, each case of deindustrialization is unique 
to the economy experiencing it. Analyzing some of the more common causal theories of 
deindustrialization will reveal that multiple factors can contribute to the process. To 
create a foundational knowledge of the phenomenon, this thesis begins with a short 
survey of deindustrialization that includes several definitions of the term, five theories of 
possible causes, and dangers associated with the premature occurrence of the process.  
B. DEFINITIONS 
Many definitions of deindustrialization are available throughout the literature. W. 
F. Lever contributes four possible meanings to the word. The first definition Lever offers 
is simply a decline in employment or output of the manufacturing industry.7 The second 
is a shift in a majority of total employment or total output from the manufacturing 
industry to the service industry.8 While these first two theories both denote a decline in 
the manufacturing industry, the key difference between them is the shift toward the 
service industry. Although economic shift toward a service-based industry is typically 
seen as a sign of economic growth, Lever annotates that the relationship between the two 
industries in the second model is relative. In this scenario, manufacturing may actually 
continue to grow, albeit at a lesser rate than the service industry.9 As a result, the total 
share of manufacturing employment or output relative to other industries is what 
declines. Alternatively, a decline in employment or output without a noted shift toward 
                                                 
7 W. F. Lever, “Deindustrialisation and the Reality of the Postindustrial City,” Urban Studies 28, no. 6 




the service industry (such as in the first model) could perhaps allude to temporary or 
cyclical economic recessions.10 It is also worth noting that a drop in manufacturing 
industry employment does not necessarily mean output will also decline. Under certain 
circumstances, manufacturing output can actually increase while employment declines. 
Such an example is seen in industries where advancements in technology reduce the need 
for low skill labor while production numbers increase.  
Lever’s third definition has global connotations as deindustrialization is 
considered to be a decline of manufactured exports in a country’s share of world trade.11 
The fourth definition can be considered an extension of the third in that the decline of 
manufactured exports leads to an inability to purchase imports that help sustain 
production, resulting in further breakdown of the manufacturing industry12 Lever’s 
multiple definitions provide an analytical explanation of the term deindustrialization 
while others provide a much more generalized explanation.  
José Gabriel Palma’s description combines aspects of Lever’s first and second 
definitions. Palma defines deindustrialization simply as the point when employment 
numbers in the manufacturing industry start to decrease, and the service industry 
becomes the main source of employment.13 For the purpose of this paper, Palma’s 
explanation serves as the foundational explanation of deindustrialization. Lever’s third 
and fourth definitions also provide an understanding of the concept and will assist in 
portraying the case studies of Brazil and Mexico in a global context.  
1. Timing Is Everything 
The process of deindustrialization can sometimes be positive. When the timing is 
right for an economy to evolve into a service-based economy, deindustrialization can be 
considered a sign of economic achievement. Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy 
                                                 
10  W. F. Lever, “Deindustrialisation and the Reality of the Postindustrial City,” 983. 
11 Ibid., 984. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Jose Gabriel Palma, “Four Sources of De-Industrialization and a New Concept of the Dutch 
Disease,” in Beyond Reforms, Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability, ed. Jose Antonio 
Ocampo (Washington, DC: World Bank Publications, 2005), 72. 
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describe the transition as the natural outcome of economic success, a sign that an 
economy has profitably reached a higher standard of living.14 However, the authors also 
admit that deindustrialization can often be the result of trouble in the manufacturing 
industry, or be connected with widespread problems throughout the entire economy.15 
Dani Rodrik reveals that there are possible dangers if the process happens too early. If 
deindustrialization occurs at a time when an economy should be building wealth and 
continuing to grow through industrialization, then economic progress can deteriorate.16 
As a result, instead of following a path of economic growth toward convergence with 
advanced economies, a state may experience stagnation resulting in economic divergence 
from global leaders.17 The emphasis of this thesis is on premature deindustrialization. 
C. CAUSAL THEORIES 
Many scholars agree that economic liberalization in Latin America and the 
resulting effects of globalization broadly explain the phenomenon of deindustrialization 
in the region.18 Economic openness and global competition created an environment in 
Latin America that proved difficult for keeping up with the manufacturing giants of East 
Asia.19 A broad explanation of the process is helpful in recognizing that there is a 
problem, but looking at causal factors on a smaller scale is useful in understanding 
individual occurrences. Several theories presented throughout the literature offer varying 
causes of manufacturing decline in conjunction with economic openness and 
globalization. Certain aspects of theories are overlapping; it is possible that each case of 
deindustrialization may have more than one causal factor. Some of the theories can serve 
as a sole causal factor, while some have a multiplier effect on other theories. The 
                                                 
14 Robert Rowthorn and Ramana Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization: Its Causes and Implications,” 
Economic Issues 10 (1997): 5, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues10/. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Rodrik, “The Perils of Premature Deindustrialization,” 3. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Juan Ariel Bogliaccini, “Trade Liberalization, Deindustrialization, and Inequality: Evidence from 
Middle-Income Latin American Countries,” Latin American Research Review 48, no. 2 (2013): 83, 
doi:10.1353/lar.2013.0028; Rodrik, “The Perils of Premature Deindustrialization,” 2. 
19 Rodrik, “The Perils of Premature Deindustrialization,” 2. 
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remainder of this chapter explores five hypotheses that pose feasible root causes of the 
process, which are attributed to both internal and external factors. 
1. Technology 
Palma offers the possibility that deindustrialization is related to advancements in 
technology. His position is that “rapid productivity growth in (at least some sectors of) 
manufacturing, brought about by the propagation of the new technological paradigm of 
microelectronics” has led to the overall decline of the manufacturing industry.20 This 
theory assumes that advanced technology increases production in manufacturing and 
therefore reduces the need for manual labor; the result is less job availability in the 
manufacturing industry.  
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy confirm that technology can create a situation of 
“asymptotic stagnancy” within an economy.21 The authors extend the argument to 
explain that technologically progressive industries (specifically the manufacturing 
industry) will standardize and improve production, and thus increase growth rates with 
fewer workers. Meanwhile, less technologically progressive industries (like many in the 
service sector where productions rates cannot be standardized) experience slower growth 
rates and become technologically stagnant. The end result is that less technologically 
progressive industries determine the growth rate of the economy as a whole, creating an 
asymptotic stagnancy within the economy.22 Theorists of this school of thought maintain 
that the lack of technological progress and the failure to diffuse technology within the 
industrial sector is what caused Latin America to fall behind.23 
2. Currency 
A second endogenous theory of deindustrialization is that the process is a 
currency-driven phenomenon. Nicolás Magud and Sebastián Sosa reveal in their IMF 
                                                 
20 Palma, “Four Sources of De-Industrialization and a New Concept of the Dutch Disease,” 74. 
21 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization: Its Causes and Implications,” 9. 
22 Ibid., 9–10. 
23 Marcio Cruz et al., Structural Change and the Service Sector in Brazil, (Universidade Federal do 
Paraná, Department of Economics, 2008): 5, http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/fupwpaper/0075.htm. 
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study that real exchange rates greatly affect economic growth. Many believe that an 
undervalued exchange rate promotes economic growth while an overvalued exchange 
rate obstructs growth, whereas some simply argue that any instability in the exchange rate 
slows economic growth.24 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy add to the argument stating that 
large increases in exchange rates can actually cause a country to lose manufacturing 
jobs.25 As the manufacturing sector deindustrializes, the service sector may be unable to 
support such an influx of labor supply. The resulting danger associated with such an 
occurrence is a decline in the growth of living standards within a country.26  
The currency argument works better as a supporting theory of deindustrialization, 
than it does as a singular cause. We will see that each situation in the four other theories 
also lead to circumstances that affect currency in manners such as inflation, investment, 
credit availability, and exchange rate fluctuations. Of those, the real exchange rate is the 
most commonly affected as it is highly dependent upon domestic policy, trade 
agreements, and global market fluctuations. Although the currency argument is closely 
related to the other theories, it still serves as a distinct concept as it is specific to each 
country; therefore it remains a valid causal factor, although in a supportive nature.27  
3. Outsourcing 
A third hypothesis for the source of deindustrialization is an exogenous cause. 
Palma refers to the new international division of labor and outsourcing as one of the 
better-known hypotheses for decreases in manufacturing within an economy.28 In the old 
colonial division of labor, countries exported raw materials and imported finished goods; 
capitalism drives the new international division of labor as countries seek to drive down 
                                                 
24 Nicolas Magud and Sebastián Sosa, “When and Why Worry about Real Exchange-Rate 
Appreciation? The Missing Link between Dutch Disease and Growth,” (IMF Working Paper No. 10/271, 
December 1, 2010), 3, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=24395.0. 
25 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization: Its Causes and Implications,” 5. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Magud and Sosa, “When and Why Worry about Real Exchange-Rate Appreciation?” 4. 
28 Palma, “Four Sources of De-Industrialization and a New Concept of the Dutch Disease,” 74. 
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export production costs and import more capital-intensive goods.29 As James Petras 
describes the cycle, cheap labor-intensive manufacturing decreases in industrializing 
countries once less expensive alternatives to manufacturing are discovered.30 As a result, 
cheaper imports increase and manufacturing demands within the country decrease.  
4. North-South Relationships and Regressive Specialization 
There is another external hypothetical cause for deindustrialization that overlaps 
with the outsourcing argument, and focuses on relationships with larger economies. In a 
North-South relationship, a wealthy more-developed country finds cost-efficient means 
of production through globalization and the use of a less-developed country’s industry.31 
The relationship can lead to output growth in the “North” country and employment 
growth in the “South” country; however, some believe that the effects of North-South 
relationships lead to both deindustrialization and regressive specialization within an 
economy.32 Christopher Kollmeyer explains that the expanse of globalization has 
increased trade connections between advanced and developing economies, which have 
contributed to deindustrialization.33 Typically in this scenario, the country of greater 
affluence is the one that experiences the deindustrialization; however, some contend that 
North-South relationships can create excessive specialization in the less-developed 
member of the relationship.34 The regressive specialization in such circumstances, 
especially in natural resource diverse economies, can also lead to deindustrialization.35 
Rowthorn and Ramaswamy also recognize North-South trade as a possible cause, but 
they consider the hypothesis to only account for a small portion of the advanced economy 
                                                 
29 James Petras, “A New International Division of Labor?,” MERIP Reports, no. 94 (February 1, 
1981): 28, doi:10.2307/3012258. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Christopher Kollmeyer, “Explaining Deindustrialization: How Affluence, Productivity Growth, and 
Globalization Diminish Manufacturing Employment,” American Journal of Sociology 114, no. 6 (May 
2009): 1649, doi:10.1086/597176 
32 Ibid., 1650.  
33 Ibid., 1662. 
34 André Cunha, et al. “Brazil in Face of Chinese Rise: The Risks of Regressive Specialization,” 
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy and International Relations 1, no. 2 (2012): 152, 
http://americo.usal.es/iberoame/sites/default/files/da_silva_et_al_brasil_face_chinese_rise.pdf. 
35 André Cunha, et al. “Brazil in Face of Chinese Rise,” 152. 
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cases that exhibit a decline in manufacturing employment, thus giving the hypothesis a 
limited role in deindustrialization trends.36 
5. The Resource Curse 
The final theory that provides a possible explanation for the source of 
deindustrialization is known as the “resource curse.” The process is also called “Dutch 
disease,” which is a term coined in the 1960s when the Netherlands experienced 
economic stagnation as a result of the discovery and production of oil in the North Sea.37 
The curse can be the result of the exploitation of one single resource (such as oil) or the 
result of many natural resource exports that collectively outperform manufactured 
exports.38  Additionally, remittances have become another source of income in Latin 
America that has an effect similar to a resource curse. Rick Eyerdam contests that 
remittances weaken the incentive to increase local productivity in Latin American 
economies.39  
As Luis Carlos Bresser-Pereira describes “Dutch disease,” the process occurs 
when a country exploits abundant natural resources so cheaply that it causes local 
currency exchange rate appreciation in the global market.40 As a result, commodity 
exports increase and manufacturing exports decrease, leading to less competition, less 
production, and more job losses in the manufacturing industry. The phenomenon is 
damaging to growing economies as it slowly leads to deindustrialization. Eyerdam 
concurs that “Dutch disease” causes manufactured goods of a country to become less 
competitive in the international market, and if left unchecked, the situation results in an 
                                                 
36 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization: Its Causes and Implications,” 8, 34. 
37 Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, “The Value of the Exchange Rate and the Dutch Disease,” Brazilian 
Journal of Political Economy 33, no. 3 (September 2013): 379, 
http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rep/v33n3/v33n3a01.pdf . 
38 Ibid., 372–373. 
39 Rick Eyerdam, “The Tulip and the Steer,” Florida Shipper 33, no. 6 (February 11, 2008): 6, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=29980
441&site=ehost-live&scope=site. 
40 Bresser-Pereira,“The Value of the Exchange Rate and the Dutch Disease,” 372. 
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increase of imports and decrease of exports; he adds that such situations will eventually 
lead to economic protectionism.41  
D. DANGERS 
Under ideal circumstances of economic development, deindustrialization is a 
welcomed phase that is required to achieve a higher level of economic affluence. 
Unfortunately, some developing countries encounter the process prematurely.42 Some of 
the dangers that premature deindustrialization bring are overvalued exchange rates, high 
interest rates, an enlarged informal sector, greater spreads in levels of income inequality, 
and overall economic stagnation.43 Negative effects such as these on a developing 
economy can result in economic decline and even divergence from other global 
economies.  
E. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has focused on defining the term deindustrialization, and developing 
the context of the phenomenon for the remainder of this thesis. The five causal theories 
are useful in applying the process to the two case studies of Brazil and Mexico in order to 
determine if each state is possibly experiencing deindustrialization at a premature rate. 
Understanding the relationships between the causal theories, and seeing where 
overlapping tendencies lie, helps to determine whether there are multiple causal factors 
present in each case study. 
                                                 
41 Eyerdam, “The Tulip and the Steer,” 6. 
42 Rodrik states that Brazil ($5,000 per capita), China ($3,000 per capita), and India ($2,000 per 
capita) are experiencing shrinking manufacturing industries at an early rate based on GDP per capita at the 
inception of deindustrialization. See Rodrik, “The Perils of Premature Deindustrialization,” 2. 
43 Bogliaccini, “Trade Liberalization, Deindustrialization, and Inequality,” 85; Rodrik, “The Perils of 
Premature Deindustrialization,” 2. 
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III. BRAZIL’S RESOURCE CURSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the largest economy in Latin America, Brazil serves as a model of success for 
other developing nations in the region. Despite success, some believe that Brazil is 
encountering premature deindustrialization in the form of a resource curse. This chapter 
looks at political and economic policies that Brazil has demonstrated over recent years 
since neoliberal reforms to help explain the country’s current situation. The five selected 
theories of deindustrialization are then applied to Brazil’s economy in an effort to 
understand why some say the resource curse afflicts the regional power. Finally, a 
solution is offered that could assist Brazil’s economic future and may provide pitfall-
avoiding guidance for other developing nations in the region.   
B. BACKGROUND 
To understand why Brazil is encountering the resource curse and beginning to 
deindustrialize, it is helpful to examine past economic policies of the Brazilian 
government, beginning with the transition from protectionism and import-substitution 
industrialization (ISI) to neoliberal reforms and a market-based economic model. Import 
substitution, designed to help backward economies catch up to global competitors, 
worked better in Brazil than it did in most of Latin America; however, by the late 1980s, 
a financial crisis arose in the country that showed signs of ISI beginning to break down.44 
When President Fernando Collor took office in 1990, his answer to solve the financial 
crisis and stop hyperinflation was a turn to neoliberalism. Collor was only in office for 
two years before he was impeached, but during that time he was able to successfully 
create a new economic path for Brazil through the promotion of privatization and 
commercial liberalization.45The result was a deregulated economy open to global 
                                                 
44 Peter R. Kingstone, “Constitutional Reform and Macroeconomic Stability: Implications for 
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil,” in Markets and Democracy in Latin America, ed. Philip Oxhorn and 
Pamela K. Starr (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 134–136. 
45 Ibid., 134–140. 
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markets. Despite Collor’s neoliberal progress, he was unable to stabilize the economy and 
inflation continued.46   
1. The Plano Real 
In 1994, the former finance minister, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, came into 
office and implemented a new stabilization plan for Brazil, the Plano Real. The plan 
called for slowly introducing a new currency, the Brazilian real, in a tightly controlled 
manner as to not shock the economy. The transfer was successful, but Cardoso 
experienced difficulties as he tried to establish financial reforms to the constitution; the 
congress proved difficult to work with. The proportional representation system involved 
18 different parties when Cardoso came to office. As a consequence of open list elections 
and large voting districts, the politicians seldom had any real ideological ties to their 
parties; instead, they valued patronage and clientalism.47 As a result, it was difficult for 
Cardoso to earn a supporting two-thirds majority of the congress to push through any 
constitutional reforms.  
The difficulty with congress did not allow for any long-term fiscal reforms 
initially, and the economy began to struggle. At first, Cardoso’s plan had the real fixed to 
the U.S. dollar.48 High interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate were the stabilizing 
properties of the plan. Increased privatization and high interest rates led to a dramatic 
increase in foreign inflow, while the overvaluation of the currency led to decreased 
inflation rates.49 Low tariffs and stable prices drove up imports and a consumption boom 
ensued. The public overspent and economic growth slowed. The government did not take 
restrictive measures to ensure fiscal responsibility, or make any progress toward public 
finance reform. Over the next few years, the government continued to decrease taxes and 
increase expenditures with wasteful measures like increasing the minimum wage and 
                                                 
46  Kingstone, “Constitutional Reform and Macroeconomic Stability: Implications for Democratic 
Consolidation in Brazil,” 134–138; Albert Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 39–41. 
47 Kingstone, “Constitutional Reform and Macroeconomic Stability: Implications for Democratic 
Consolidation in Brazil,” 141. 
48 Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 44. 
49 Kingstone, “Constitutional Reform and Macroeconomic Stability: Implications for Democratic 
Consolidation in Brazil,” 134; Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 45–46. 
 17 
government pensions. Interest rates continued to rise, and slowly the nation slipped into a 
recession as capital reserve surpluses dwindled. The public went into significant debt in 
excess of 200 billion real.50 In 1997, the International Monetary Fund agreed to a $41.6 
billion loan to Brazil, but the amount was insufficient for economic rescue.51 The 
exchange rate of the real began to fall; it was evident that serious fiscal reforms were 
necessary.52 
2. Macroeconomic Trinity 
In 1999, the government shifted the real to a floating exchange rate that relied 
upon market fluctuations in order to stabilize the currency and retain reserves. The 
change marked a new era of economic policy focusing on fiscal responsibility. Albert 
Fishlow writes that in addition to the new floating exchange rate, openness to foreign 
capital inflow and inflation targeting created a new “macroeconomic trinity.”53 The 
congress, now more willing to work on financial reforms passed the Law of Fiscal 
Responsibility in 2000 as part of the previous loan agreement with the IMF. The law 
centered on reducing deficits and restricting future indebtedness through responsible 
fiscal measures. Over the next several years, the government increased taxes and 
exercised expenditure restraint in order to foster foreign trade while maintaining slow 
economic growth and a moderate surplus.54  
Precursors of deindustrialization are seen throughout the Cardoso years. Sectors 
suffered horrible consequences of the massive import consumption phase. Low tariff 
rates on imports limited domestic prices. To adjust to the new demands, businesses had to 
modernize though the introduction of new technology. Many firms were forced to 
downsize and some went out of business.55 From the evidence Philip Ueno provides, the 
                                                 
50 Kingstone, “Constitutional Reform and Macroeconomic Stability: Implications for Democratic 
Consolidation in Brazil,” 144; Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 44. 
51 Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 46. 
52  Kingstone, “Constitutional Reform and Macroeconomic Stability: Implications for Democratic 
Consolidation in Brazil,” 146–156; Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 43–47. 
53 Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 47. 
54 Ibid., 47–48. 
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percentage of GDP from industry sharply declined from 40 to 28 percent in 1994 when 
the Plano Real was introduced.56 Industry stagnated for many years after. Concurrently, 
the service sector’s percentage of GDP skyrocketed from 50 to 67 percent.57 In addition 
to early signs of deindustrialization, the beginning signs of “Dutch disease” were evident 
in an increase of agriculture and mineral commodity exports over the same period of 
industrial stagnation.58  
3. Growth Acceleration Program 
Little change in economic policy occurred under the Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
presidency; instead, the administration maintained the economic stability that Cardoso 
instituted while achieving modest economic growth.59 Pedro Luiz Barros Silva, José 
Carlos de Souza Braga, and Vera Lúcia Cabral Costa suggest that while Brazil traveled 
along a path of “capital accumulation” brought on with the Cardoso reforms, the Lula 
administration focused more upon social reform and left the economic policies relatively 
unchecked.60 While Lula’s social programs like Bolsa Famíla achieved both success and 
popularity, the economic situation continued to shift away from manufacturing as 
demands for commodity exports increased. Although Silva, Braga, and Costa contest that 
deindustrialization is happening in Brazil, they admit to the increase in commodity 
production and claim the current economic path is unsustainable for future growth.61 The 
authors label Brazil as “underdeveloped” and recommend socio-economic policy reforms 
in order to increase technology innovation, reduce foreign capital dependence, and build 
                                                 
56 Philip Ueno, “Can Dutch Disease Harm the Export Performance of Brazilian Industry?” 
(Conference Paper presented at the Druid Summer Conference 2010, Opening Up Innovation: Strategy, 
Organization and Technology, Imperial College London Business School, 2010): 18, 
http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.php?id=501363&cf=43. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 71. 
59 Silva, de Souza Braga, and Cabral Costa, “Lula’s Administration at a Crossroads: The Difficult 
Combination of Stability and Development in Brazil,” 125. 
60 Ibid., 124–139. 
61 Ibid., 138. 
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infrastructure.62 A comparison of these authors’ recommendations with others in the 
literature suggests that the country is encountering premature deindustrialization. 
With the increasing shift toward commodity exports, the Lula administration 
realized the need for a plan that ensured continued economic growth for Brazil. In 2007, 
a multi-faceted plan called the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC) was introduced. 
Amidst the various components of the plan, a commitment of $235 billion was dedicated 
to increasing infrastructure and industrial capabilities.63  Among the things that have been 
hurting Brazil’s economic activities, poor logistics due to dismal infrastructure is one of 
the front-runners. Rick Eyerdam reveals, “In the region, Brazil has the fourth most 
inefficient export and import system, just behind Bolivia, Colombia, and El Salvador.”64 
Lula’s plan included the construction of roads, airports, waterways, ports, railroads, and 
energy production facilities.65 
4. The Greater Brazil Plan 
The PAC plan continued on into the next administration in 2010. President Dilma 
Rousseff announced her updated plan in 2011. The Greater Brazil Plan continued what 
PAC started and also focused on supporting economic growth through foreign trade, 
innovation and technology, expanding markets, and continuing to improve 
infrastructure.66 Despite efforts, economic growth has been relatively weak under 
Rousseff’s administration. The increasing commodity prices have helped to curb the 
strong real exchange rate that deteriorated the economy in the late 1990s; however, as 
long as commodity export growth exceeds manufacturing export growth, the real will 
maintain a strongly overvalued exchange rate and deindustrialization will continue to 
                                                 
62  Silva, de Souza Braga, and Cabral Costa, “Lula’s Administration at a Crossroads: The Difficult 
Combination of Stability and Development in Brazil,” 136–137. 
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trouble Brazil’s economy.67 Furthermore, with the recent discovery of pre-salt oil fields, 
the plague of “Dutch disease” could fester as oil production is scheduled to increase in 
the coming years.68  
C. APPLYING THE FIVE THEORIES 
Some believe that the problem that Brazil faces is that the country is beginning to 
show signs of deindustrialization at a premature stage in comparison to other states that 
have successfully encountered the process under normal circumstances of economic 
progress. Although the country has experienced economic growth in recent years, 
premature deindustrialization is still occurring. Brazil’s most recent GDP per capita in 
2013 was only $14,750 U.S. dollars.69 As a comparison, the average GDP per capita of 
all member countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) was $36,427 U.S. dollars in 2012.70 Although Brazil is not a member of OECD, 
it stands to learn from the organization as many of the current members have undergone a 
successful transition of deindustrialization, which all occurred at much higher GDP rates 
than Brazil exhibits. Rodrik reveals that when countries like the U.S., Great Britain, 
Germany, and Sweden began to deindustrialize in the 1990s, their GDP per capita ranged 
between $9,000 and $11,000; in comparison, Brazil’s per capita was only $5,000 when 
the country began to deindustrialize (see Figure 2).71 A multitude of factors contribute to 
Brazil’s predicament, but many scholars concur that the resource curse could be the 
primary cause of premature deindustrialization in the country. Applying the five theories 
to Brazil’s economic situation reveals that the “Dutch disease” is a logical explanation for 
Brazil’s troubles. 
                                                 
67 Eugenio J. Alemán, “The Brazilian Exchange Rate Conundrum.” (Wells Fargo Securities 
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70 Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, June 
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Figure 2.  Peak Manufacturing Levels72 
1. Technology  
In Brazil’s case, a few sectors such as the aviation and auto industries have 
experienced advancements in high-technology production, which in turn have led to job 
losses in manufacturing.73 The issues that Brazil faces deal more with decreased 
manufacturing due to a lack of technology. These low-tech problems that plague Brazil’s 
manufacturing industry stem from the difficulties incurred from Brazilian policy, 
outsourcing, and the technological advances of Brazil’s competitors. According to 
research from the Department of Economics at the Federal University of Paraná, certain 
Brazilian policies profoundly affected industrial technological advancements within the 
country and therefore reduced market competiveness.74  Figure 3 depicts the growth of 
the service sector in comparison to the stagnation of advanced technology in Brazil. 
Adding to the argument, Pierre Salama writes that Brazil failed to market high-
technology exports and therefore, lost out in global competition to countries such as 
                                                 
72 Dani Rodrik, “On Premature Deindustrialization,” Dani Rodrik’s Weblog: Unconventional 
Thoughts on Economic Development and Globalization, October 11, 2013, 
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73 Fishlow, Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985, 70. 
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China that were able to sell similar products at a lower price.75 While Brazil does face 
technology challenges, the internal deficiencies that exist within the economy stem from 
other internal and external causal factors; therefore, technology does not seem to be the 
primary cause of deindustrialization in Brazil. 
 
Figure 3.   Participation of Subsectors in Employment in the Service Sector, 
Grouped by Technological Intensity (1995-2006).76 
2. Currency 
Brazil’s Economic Outlook Report for the fourth quarter of 2011 directly 
attributed the process of deindustrialization to the rampant appreciation of the Brazilian 
real exchange rate.77 According to the report, the strong real is reducing competition 
within the manufacturing sector, damaging trade, and forcing a reliance on foreign 
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capital.78 Another report details that the real appreciated in value by 36.2% between 2008 
and 2011 creating a circumstance where foreign competitors were able to undercut 
domestic manufacturers in Brazil (see Figure 4).79 When a country experiences a 
situation where competitors develop products in a more efficient manner, the effects can 
be seen in the undersold economy; exports in the manufacturing sector decrease while 
imports increase. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy attest that manufacturing jobs can decrease 
when an economy confronts large increases in exchange rates, such as Brazil 
encountered.80 The case for currency-driven deindustrialization is a well-documented and 
convincing argument. It is highly likely that Brazil’s currency dilemma has helped to 
create and continues to exacerbate the economic situation; however, it is difficult to pin it 
as a singular cause of the phenomenon. Currency appreciation is often dependent upon 
other driving factors, such as domestic policy, foreign trade agreements, and the global 
economy. 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
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2011): 10.  
80 Rowthorn and Ramaswamy, “Deindustrialization: Its Causes and Implications,” 5. 
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Figure 4.  Brazilian Real Exchange Rate against U.S. Dollar 2008–2013.81 
3. Outsourcing  
James Petras looks at a new international division of labor and outsourcing as 
possible causes of manufacturing decline within an economy.82 This theory is a 
legitimate possibility when considering the amount of trading that occurs between Brazil 
and China. Niu Haibin ascribes increased trade with China as the reason for a decrease in 
Brazilian manufacturing and exports. Haibin reveals that in 2010, the ratio of Brazilian 
companies importing from Brazil, compared to Brazilian companies exporting to China, 
was a staggering 10:1.83 While the hypothesis of outsourcing undoubtedly has affected 
the production numbers of Brazilian manufacturing, it is difficult to view the 
phenomenon as the prime source of deindustrialization; instead, outsourcing appears to 
be only a part of the equation to help explain Brazil’s situation. The rest of the equation 
includes trade relationships and a shift in primary exports, as seen in the next two 
theories.  
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4. North-South Relationships 
João Augusto de Castro Neves and former Brazilian minister of finance, Luis 
Carlos Bresser-Pereira believe that the connection between China and Brazil has become 
a North-South relationship causing some to think that the imbalance is causing dramatic 
changes in the Brazilian economy that are leading to deindustrialization.84 André Cunha, 
Marcos Lélis, Julimar Bichara, and Manuela de Lima are among those who believe the 
North-South relationship is one of the main sources of Brazil’s economic trouble; they 
explain that the trade relationship between China and Brazil is leading to regressive 
specialization and over-exploitation of natural resources.85 The concept of regressive 
specialization in this theory aligns with an outsourcing argument. The belief is that cheap 
Chinese imports are driving down the output of the Brazilian manufacturing industry, 
which then forces Brazil’s focus to shift toward commodity-based exports. The theory is 
a double-edged sword; while Chinese outsourcing is damaging Brazil’s manufacturing 
industry, the Asian superpower’s high demand of natural resources is driving up the 
production of Brazilian commodity exports.86 The theory of regressive specialization as 
the result of a North-South relationship with China seems like it may provide a more 
logical cause of deindustrialization in Brazil, but it is difficult to fault the nature of the 
relationship when the Brazilian government was responsible for the trade policies that 
have created the situation. It is possible that there may be more to regressive 
specialization than strictly a North-South relationship. Brazil’s shift toward natural 
resource export dependency in this theory is a link to the last hypothesis that best 
explains deindustrialization in Brazil—“Dutch disease.” 
5. The Resource Curse (Dutch Disease) 
“Dutch disease” incorporates both internal and external factors as it encompasses 
aspects of each of the previously listed theories. First, the process is directly linked to, 
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and actually creates currency overvaluation. Second, the theory provides a better 
explanation for regressive specialization that occurs in Brazil. Third, the process creates 
an environment where low-tech industries cannot survive. Finally, the decline in the 
manufacturing industry results in outsourcing in order to produce products more cheaply. 
To be clear, each of the other theories can be contributing factors in other examples of 
deindustrialization that are not resource based; however, in the case of Brazil, “Dutch 
disease” is the most convincing explanation for a possible cause of premature 
deindustrialization. 
a. Brazil’s Disease 
In the case of Brazil, “Dutch disease” is the most convincing explanation of 
premature deindustrialization. In contrast to other countries that have experienced the 
resource curse due to the over production of one particular resource (typically oil) the 
Brazilian case is a little more difficult to diagnose because the phenomenon is spread 
across many different resources. Brazil is one of the world’s top producers and exporters 
of beef, chicken, coffee, soybeans, sugar, tobacco, orange juice, iron ore, and ethanol.87 
With so many commodities driving the exchange rate, it is difficult to recognize the 
traditional symptoms of the resource curse in Brazil and be able to link them to any one 
export. The resulting process occurs at a slower pace than it has in countries with strictly 
petroleum-caused “Dutch disease.”88 Throughout the literature, scholars highlight subtle 
variances regarding the exact nature of the “Dutch disease” that Brazil is experiencing, 
but those differences are inconsequential in this paper.  
Luis Carlos Bresser-Pereira and Nelson Marconi claim that the evidence of the 
disease’s presence in Brazil is apparent in the current exchange rate overvaluation, the 
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low wages in low-tech industry, and the rise of prices in commodity exports.89 The 
authors also reveal that “Dutch disease” is affecting the high-technology sectors the most 
as it is those industries that should be leading the country in economic development, but 
are instead lagging behind. Looking at the breakdown of exports percentages between 
1997 and 2008 explains the situation; they show that during that time period, exports of 
primary products (resource commodities) grew 366 percent while manufactured goods 
exports only increased 244 percent.90 The difference equates to a 35 percent growth 
advantage of primary exports over manufactured exports. Looking at imports over the 
same timeframe, the difference is substantial, primary imports only increased 26 percent 
while manufactured goods increased 154 percent.91 Figure 5 shows the shift in 
manufactured and primary exports from 2000–2010. 
 
Figure 5.  Shift in Brazilian Exports 2000–2010.92 
Rick Eyerdam provides further insight; he breaks down Brazilian exports into 
three categories: basic products, semi-manufactured products, and manufactured 
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products.93 Basic products account for resource commodities, while semi-manufactured 
products are refined commodities such as iron and pulp. Manufactured products account 
for exports that the manufacturing industry produces. Looking at results from 2007, 
manufactured products accounted for $84 billion in exports, an increase of 11.4 percent 
from the previous year. Basic products accounted for $51.6 billion with a 27.6 percent 
increase over 2006.94 Although the statistics only account for one year, the data are 
congruent with what Pereira and Marconi show from 1997–2008. The numbers display a 
significantly higher percentage of growth in the resource sector than in the manufacturing 
industry. Eyerdam also looks at overall exports to imports in the same year. In 2007, 
exports grew 16.6 percent above 2006 levels while imports increased 32 percent.95 An 
increase in imports is due to the decrease in the manufacturing industry as Pereira and 
Marconi showed. The evidence not only supports existence of “Dutch disease” in Brazil, 
but also that deindustrialization is occurring. In figure 6, the decline in manufacturing is 
seen as a decrease in value added to GDP.  
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Figure 6.  Percentage of value added to GDP 1990-2006.96 
b. Solutions 
Although it seems that the Brazilian government is aware of the dangers that exist 
with deindustrialization, the chosen courses of action are not altogether reassuring. The 
current policies in place are designed for economic growth, not for neutralizing “Dutch 
disease.” According to Bresser-Pereira, there are only two ways to neutralize the effects 
of the resource curse. The first way is for the government to establish complete control 
over the exchange rate, the way that China does; however, this solution is not applicable 
to floating exchange rates for obvious reasons. Brazil would have to shift back to a fixed 
exchange rate. The second solution is to tax the exports that cause the disease in an 
amount that is proportional to the overvaluation of the currency. This tax is compatible 
with a floating exchange rate, varies with market fluctuations, and would change from 
commodity to commodity. In the present case of Brazil, the tax should be between 20 and 
25 percent of the commodity’s export costs in order to neutralize “Dutch disease.”97  
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Based on the research conducted, the evidence is convincing that Brazil is indeed 
suffering from “Dutch disease,” which, in turn, is slowly causing the country to 
deindustrialize prematurely. After reviewing the possible endogenous and exogenous 
causes of deindustrialization in Brazil, the country does suffer from a lack of technology, 
overvalued currency, outsourcing, and regressive specialization; however, the real source 
of Brazil’s problems stem from a resource curse. A review of Brazil’s political history 
since neoliberal reforms shows how each administration tried to handle economic reform 
issues in order to sustain growth, but all efforts led directly to the present situation that 
the country now struggles with. The current administration has put forth efforts to ensure 
continued economic growth, but the only way that Brazil will truly succeed is to 
recognize the dangers of the current dilemma. Once the government acknowledges the 
presence of “Dutch disease,” the neutralization process can be applied to reverse the 
effects of deindustrialization and true economic growth can prevail. Developing states 
can learn many lessons from Brazil’s history of mismatched economic policies, current 
trade patterns, and trade agreements. How Brazil chooses to handle premature 
deindustrialization could determine its economic success, and those choices could also 
influence the decisions of other regional developing states. 
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IV. MEXICO’S DISGUISED DILEMMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Since the neoliberal reforms of the Mexican economy, the state has experienced a 
dissimilar path of economic development than Brazil. While some contend that Mexico’s 
path has not led the country to experience premature deindustrialization, others maintain 
that Mexico is experiencing the phenomenon. The situation in Mexico however, is a 
different set of circumstances than what is seen in Brazil. To show that Mexico is 
prematurely experiencing a form of deindustrialization, it is helpful to examine the 
country’s trajectory since neoliberal reforms. An analysis of political and economic 
policies of the past and a look at the effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) assists in understanding Mexico’s current situation. Finally, despite the 
different paths Mexico and Brazil took during neo-liberal reforms, applying the theories 
of de-industrialization to this case study reveal that the countries are experiencing similar 
hardships associated with the phenomenon.  
B. BACKGROUND  
To better understand the situation, it is helpful to recognize the similar economic 
histories of Brazil and Mexico. Peter Hakim writes that the two states followed similar 
paths for 60 years; each country experienced high growth rates during the period of 
1940–1980, followed by debt burdens, economic decline, and gradual recoveries.98 After 
establishing neoliberal reforms that opened the economies to global markets, the 
countries followed different paths for continued growth. While Brazil took a limited 
approach to economic liberalization and exporting, Mexico made exporting and open 
trade the centerpiece of the economy.99  
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1. From ISI to FDI  
Prior to opening markets to the global economy, Mexico experienced about 40 
years of economic success during a period known as the Mexican Miracle.100  During this 
time, the Mexican government focused on substitution of imports and maintained sound 
economic policies. The import substitution industrialization period produced stable real 
gross domestic product growth rates in Mexico that averaged 6.3 percent throughout the 
40-year phase from the 1940s to the early 1980s.101 The policies in place during the 
Miracle also maintained low inflation rates and limited foreign dependency.102 
Government subsidies and incentive for industries within the domestic market effectively 
generated steady growth. An oil boom in the 1970s and early 1980s helped add to the 
success; however, as oil production increased, the economy relied heavily upon oil 
revenues. Poor fiscal mismanagement in the 1970s during the Escheveria administration 
created a fiscal deficit in the balance of accounts. As oil profits continued, domestic 
borrowing also went up and the deficit increased. Inflation of the Mexican peso 
skyrocketed, causing the government to implement harsh economic reforms that further 
damaged the economy.103 
In 1982, the Mexican Miracle came to an end, as the import substitution policies 
in place could not sustain government expenditures or continued growth of the economy. 
Norio Usui makes the point that the revenues from the oil boom of the 1970s and 1980s 
had created signs of “Dutch disease” in Mexican economy.104 Instead of putting oil 
revenues toward strengthening other industrial exports, the government reinvested 
windfalls back into the state owned oil company, PEMEX, to build up the infrastructure 
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of the oil industry. The sudden increase in GDP also led to excessive foreign borrowing, 
which helped contribute to the macroeconomic mismanagement and the encounter with 
“Dutch disease.”105 The ensuing economic slowdown of the early 1980s that Mexico 
experienced showed the telltale signs of the resource curse. To recover from the 1982 
debt crisis, Ebrima Faal conveys that Mexico established economic and structural reforms 
to include tax system reforms, trade liberalization, privatization of enterprises, and 
currency exchange rate reforms.106 With the election of Miguel de la Madrid in 1982, 
new structural reforms opened the markets to the private sector to increase capital and 
technology, entice foreign investment, and eliminate regulations that stifled 
competition.107 The trade reforms removed restrictions on foreign trade and Mexico 
became a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade/ World Trade 
Organization (GATT/WTO) in 1986.108 Reforms introduced with the Pacto de 
Solidaridad Económica in 1986, sought to halt inflation with fiscal policies such as 
privatization of publicly owned enterprises, and increasing cuts to government 
spending.109 Francisco Gonzalez points out that the Salinas presidency in the early 1990s 
attempted to further combat inflation by fixing the peso to the U.S. dollar, a weak macro-
economic policy effort to stabilize inflation rates.110 The Salinas administration was able 
to lower the inflation rate to 6.4 percent, a vast improvement over the 1987 rate of 187.8 
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percent; however, despite the reforms, real GDP growth did not return to the levels seen 
during the Miracle years.111  
In January of 1994, Mexico further liberalized the economy and joined together 
with the U.S. and Canada in the North American Free Trade Agreement, marking a 
distinctive shift in economic trajectory that has, since then, defined Mexico’s 
economy.112 That same year, however, Mexico faced more financial and political issues. 
Concurrently, the peso was pegged to the U.S. dollar, which resulted in it being 
extremely overvalued and led to a severe increase in Mexico’s current account deficits. In 
an attempt to get the growing debt under control, the government was forced to devalue 
the peso.113 The Mexican government was out of money and had no choice but to shift to 
a floating exchange rate; the economy plunged into a deep recession as the inflation rate 
soared once again (see Figure 7).114 In addition to the financial crisis of 1994, which later 
became known as the Tequila Crisis, a great amount of political turmoil erupted. The 
assassination of presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio, corruption in the 1994 
presidential elections, and an armed Zapatistas rebellion in Chiapas (which coincided 
with the January First NAFTA enactment) all helped to create a high level of uncertainty 
for foreign investors.115  The result was a reduction in foreign investments and a sharp 
decline in foreign reserves. As Joseph Whitt describes the shock, “almost overnight, 
Mexico lost its reputation for maintaining a stable exchange rate and sound financial 
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policies.”116 To halt the economic decline, Mexico accepted a $50 billion bailout from 
the United States.  
 
Figure 7.  GDP Growth and Currency Inflation, 1960–2000.117 
2. NAFTA  
The NAFTA union between Mexico, the United States, and Canada went into 
effect January 1, 1994; but the origins of the arrangement stem from various framework 
agreements throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.118 The purpose of the agreement 
was to gradually eliminate tariffs between the three members over a 15-year period and to 
reduce nontariff barriers such as import licenses and Mexico’s restrictive auto decree.119 
Some tariffs were eliminated immediately while others were slowly phased-out allowing 
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for a gradual increase in trade activity between members. The liberalizing trade 
agreements that were created in the late 1980s between Mexico and the U.S. shaped a 
trade relationship where 50 percent of Mexican exports were already entering the U.S. 
market at the time NAFTA went into effect. Bradford DeLong, Christopher DeLong, and 
Sherman Robinson argue that because of preexisting trade agreements, NAFTA “did not 
greatly expand Mexico’s access to the U.S. market.”120 Despite the lack of expansion, M. 
Ayhan Kose, Guy M. Meredith, and Christopher M. Towe contend that of the three 
countries, Mexico still had a considerable advantage in the agreement as U.S. imports 
from Mexico increased 35 percent between 1993 and 2001.121 The authors also assert 
that future stability of the Mexican government benefitted from NAFTA because “the 
agreement formally linked Mexico’s domestic economic reform program to an 
international agreement and made it unlikely for future governments of Mexico to 
abandon it.”122 Interestingly, DeLong et al. believe that had the Mexican government 
foreseen the 1994 financial crisis, “the case for NAFTA would have been stronger, not 
weaker” as Mexico’s access to the U.S. market would have provided greater reassurance 
for foreign investors.123  
The literature maintains that neoliberal reforms, including entering into NAFTA, 
reshaped the Mexican Economy towards an export led model of development and 
assisted in rescuing the state from the financial disaster of 1994. Aside from the initial 
advantages that Mexico gained, NAFTA continued to benefit the Mexican economy; but 
overall, scholars agree that the results could have been better. M. Angeles Villarreal and 
Ian F. Fergusson describe the effects of NAFTA to be “positive but modest” when 
referring to a World Bank study. 124 The study assessed that NAFTA caused Mexico to 
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converge with U.S. and Canada development levels, specifically accrediting some of the 
success to Mexican manufacturers adapting to U.S. industrial technology advancements. 
In addition to progressive moves in manufacturing, foreign direct investment flows to 
Mexico increased dramatically as a result of improved access to U.S. markets that 
NAFTA facilitated.125 Kose et al. highlight that Mexican GDP also improved after the 
agreement, rising to an average annual rate of four percent between 1996 and 2002.126 
Figure 8 shows the dramatic increase in GDP from Mexican imports and exports in 
comparison with other Latin American countries. The statistics are convincing, but there 
is another side to the NAFTA argument. 
 
Figure 8.  Latin American Imports plus Exports over GDP.127 
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3. The Wage Gap 
The other side of the NAFTA argument contends that the wage gap remained a 
problem under NAFTA even though advancements in trade liberalization increased FDI 
(with added access to U.S. markets), induced economic convergence (as the result of 
adapting to technology), and increased GDP (while Mexico restructured to an export led 
economy). Gerardo Esquivel and José Antonio Rodríguez-López use wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled laborers as an economic indicator to make their point that 
NAFTA failed in closing the wage gap. The authors admit that a large increase in trade 
activity, like what Mexico experienced with NAFTA, creates an expectation for a 
decrease in wage inequality, but that decrease was never seen.128 Their argument reveals 
that the technological changes brought about through NAFTA are actually responsible for 
an increase in demand of high skilled workers, thus creating an expansion of the wage 
gap.129 Despite the advances in the manufacturing industry, NAFTA did not have 
positive effects on the wage gap due to the large amount of unskilled laborers in Mexico.  
Maquiladoras 
Raúl Delgado-Wise and Humberto Márquez Covarrubias extend the wage gap 
argument, focusing on the increased use of cheap labor since the inception of NAFTA. 
The authors pose an argument that instead of a traditional export-led growth model, 
Mexico is actually caught up in what they term a “labor export-led model.”130 Centering 
the model on three mechanisms—the maquiladora industry, disguised maquiladoras, and 
labor migration—the authors contend that NAFTA created an environment in which U.S. 
corporations increased the exploitation of cheap Mexican labor through the maquiladora 
industry.131  
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The maquiladora industry developed from the Border Industrialization Program 
when the Mexican government sought to provide jobs in the neglected northern regions 
after the Bracero Program ended in the 1960s (see figure 9).132 The concept of a maquila 
allows foreign investors to capitalize on cheap labor in a tax free zone, while in return, 
supply an employment source for an area with a large population of unskilled laborers. 
The design was meant to be a win-win scenario for both Mexico and the United States, 
but the corporations undoubtedly ended up with the better hand. A quote from the 
website of the Made in Mexico Inc. company does not even attempt to mask the true 
purpose of a maquiladora: 
Maquiladora: (mäkelädo´rä ) n. Synonymous with Mexico manufacturing, 
Maquiladoras are Mexican assembly plants that manufacture finished 
goods for export. Maquiladoras are generally owned by non-Mexican 
corporations that take advantage of low-cost Mexican labor, advantageous 
tariff regulations, and close proximity to U.S markets. Maquiladoras are 
one of Mexico (sic) primary sources of foreign exchange.133 
 
Figure 9.  Maquiladora Locations and Production in Billions (Pesos, 2003).134 
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International corporations largely control the production of exports from 
maquiladoras, which simply serve as assembly facilities. The parent companies import all 
the machines, technology, equipment, and products used to manufacture the exported 
goods.135 After assembly in a tax free zone, the products are then exported back to the 
same country, usually the United States. This process allows for the parent company to 
keep import costs to around 80–90 percent of the product’s export value, leaving the 
workers’ wages as the main source of increased value that is integrated back into the 
domestic economy.136 The secluded production trend reduces the need of national 
manufactured goods for assembly of the final product and forces local companies in the 
national manufacturing industry to go out of business. As a result, the rate of imported 
manufactured items increases to make up for the loss of nationally produced products that 
are no longer available in the domestic market. In sum, this phenomenon of the 
maquiladora industry imports a high percentage of productive process inputs, makes 
Mexican labor the largest portion of the manufacturing industry’s value added to the 
GDP, and has closed the doors of at least 40 productive chains in the national 
manufacturing industry; for these reasons, Delgado-Wise and Márquez contend that 
Mexico is de-industrializing.137  
Another critic of Mexico’s labor-export model is James M. Cypher, who agrees 
that instead of helping the backwards economy recover, NAFTA actually created the 
burdensome low-wage export strategy that has limited employment growth and 
constrained the markets.138 Although the manufacturing industry (technically the 
maquiladora industry) has been on the rise in Mexico over recent years, and accounts for 
a large majority of the country’s exports, Cypher also makes the argument that Mexico 
has actually de-industrialized under NAFTA.139 After the 1993 agreement, the amount of 
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maquiladoras increased along with the levels of maquila employment, production, and 
exports resulting in foreign firms accounting for 80 percent of Mexico’s total exports.140 
Cypher refines the argument, linking the decline in national manufacturing and raise in 
maquiladoras with wage trends in both industries. Under NAFTA, Maquila wages 
increased three percent while real manufacturing wages declined 12 percent; the net 
result is that Mexico experienced a decline in GDP per capita between 1980 and 2005, 
despite the increased production of exports.141 This rationale, combined with the 
reduction of national manufacturing facilities, and the decline of manufacturing 
contributions to GDP, provides convincing evidence of deindustrialization in Mexico.  
In 2006, the Mexican government incorporated what Cypher calls “disguised 
maquilas” (corporations that operate outside of the maquiladora regime but are still 
highly dependent on exports, such as the auto and electronics industries) and maquilas 
under one category known as the Manufacturing, Maquiladora and Export Services 
Industry (IMMEX).142 In 2008, the IMMEX firms were responsible for 76 percent of 
Mexico’s product, and in 2007, 90 percent of IMMEX products were exports delivered to 
the United States.143 Looking at Figure 10, it is clear that manufactured exports 
skyrocketed with the signing of NAFTA, yet the level of manufactured imports has 
remained above the level of exports. One explanation could be the increased amount of 
imports needed to make up for the decline in small-business national manufacturing; once 
local manufacturing businesses close, the maquiladora industry has to import products 
that were previously available on the domestic market. Additionally, the chart shows that 
while manufactured exports have continued to grow, the percentage of GDP that the 
manufacturing industry provides has slowly, yet steadily declined. The numbers confirm 
what Cypher, Delgado-Wise, and Márquez all agree upon; Mexico has become a cheap-
labor export-led economy, and the national manufacturing industry is declining because 
of it. 
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Figure 10.  Mexico Manufacturing Imports and Exports vs. percentage of 
GDP.144 
4. The Resource Curse 
Aside from the NAFTA affect, another perception of Mexico’s economic 
stagnation is based on beliefs that Mexico was, in recent years, stuck in the oil trap. In 
Gabriel Farfán-Mares’ view, despite Mexico’s growth in manufacturing exports and 
successfully “de-petrolizing its export sector and national economy,” the fiscal policy of 
the government was oil-supported for the last 40 years.145 As a result, he writes that 
Mexico “is an oil-rentier state that, from a comparative standpoint, suffers from some of 
the maladies associated with the oil curse.”146  Unlike traditional cases of the resource 
curse, Farfán-Mares’ argument does not assert that Mexico’s oil curse affects the 
manufacturing industry; instead he claims that the problem is centered on political 
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spending habits, which directly affect public policy and the economy.147 His suggestion is 
for the government to not rely on oil production windfalls, but instead, “take advantage of 
this development to transition to a more productive, efficient and modern economy that 
will be more responsive to, and make better use of, its citizens’ talents and 
capabilities.”148 Such changes have recently occurred in Mexico; new reforms for the oil 
industry promise change for the state. The reforms will privatize much of PEMEX and 
reduce government dependency on the oil industry, creating new opportunities for foreign 
investment.149 This change navigates the country away from what scholars in the late 
1990s feared—that Mexico’s oil-induced resource curse would increase exchange rates, 
draw resources from tradable sectors, and result in diminished production in 
manufacturing.150  Even though the manufacturing industry in Mexico has gone the route 
of maquiladoras (giving the appearance of success) Farfán-Mares argues that the oil-
rentier mentality has taken a toll on Mexico, and the economy will continue to stagnate 
until better macro-economic policy is in place. It is too soon to determine what affect the 
new oil reforms will have, but if successful, Mexico’s government should be able to 
reduce its dependency on oil profits in the coming years. 
5. Remittances 
Another argument that the resource curse has affected the Mexican economy is 
found in the issue of remittances from Mexican workers in the United States (figure 11 
shows Mexico’s remittances compared to all other Latin American countries). As Matiur 
Rahman, Andrew Foshee, and Muhammad Mustafa explain the scenario, the remittances 
that Mexican workers in the U.S. send home to their families in Mexico end up 
strengthening the Mexican peso. As the peso appreciates, it hurts exports from Mexico 
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and induces higher demand of non-traded goods (labor). In turn, the increase of non-
tradable goods leads to further appreciation of the exchange rate and further reduction of 
export activity of tradable goods. The result is a phenomenon with similar characteristics 
to “Dutch disease.”151  A study conducted for the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
confirms that increased inflow of remittances into a developing economy could lead to a 
decline in the manufacturing of tradable goods.152 The report maintains the position that 
remittances can be good for a developing economy, but without proper exchange rate 
policies, the possibility of inducing “Dutch disease” is a legitimate threat.  
Another report for the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas agrees that remittances can 
be good for growing economies and reveals that the amount of remittances in Mexico are 
higher than any other developing country (see Table 1) and that remittance flows are the 
second largest source of external funding in developing countries after FDI.153 When 
examining the percentages in Table 2, it is clear that developing countries in Central 
America heavily depend on remittances as a significant portion of GDP. For this reason, 
Mexico serves as an important role model for smaller developing states when it comes to 
handling remittances. Ensuring sound fiscal policy and establishing strict exchange rate 
guidelines are vital for avoiding the pitfalls of “Dutch disease” and it provides a good 
example for developing neighbor states. 
Other areas of interest throughout the literature may assist in understanding 
Mexico’s current economic state but do not explain the entire story by themselves. Some 
think that Mexico’s economic growth problems do not stem from deindustrialization or 
any type of resource curse. Gordon Hanson does not believe the oil curse has hit Mexico, 
but instead highlights Mexico’s economic stagnation as stemming from other 
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problems.154 Interestingly, three of the problem that Hanson’s highlights (competition 
with Chinese exports, Mexico’s informal workers, and lack of new technology) are all 
closely linked to the theoretical causes of deindustrialization previously mentioned in this 
thesis (Each theory in relation to Mexico is addressed later in this paper).  
 
Figure 11.  Total Remittances Received in Latin America and Mexico, 2000–
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Table 1.   Remittances Received 2013 estimates (millions, U.S. dollars).156  
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Table 2.   Remittances as a Share of GDP, 2012 (percentage).157 
                      
 
C. GROWTH OR STAGNATION? 
Although the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether Mexico is 
experiencing signs of premature deindustrialization, a legitimate argument cannot be 
made without looking at the opposite side of the dispute. Some scholars view Mexico as a 
hotspot of economic growth that provides abundant opportunities of future prosperity for 
investors. One of the leading advocates for Mexico’s potential is Shannon K. O’Neil, 
who provides an optimistic view of Mexico’s recent successes and considers it one of the 
top markets to watch in coming years.158 Despite the positive outlook, she brings to light 
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some valid points for further research concerning areas that are bridling Mexico’s 
progress; she admits that “economically weak infrastructure holds the nation back” and 
believes that the economy is “still handicapped by institutional weakness.”159 O’Neil also 
identifies the challenge of economic inequality in Mexico, which mirrors the wage gap 
argument that Esquivel and Rodríguez-López make concerning NAFTA’s failure in the 
manufacturing industry.160 Lastly, O’Neil recognizes that the oil industry has given way 
to the manufacturing industry, which now accounts for 75 percent of Mexico’s export. 
Just looking at the numbers of the manufacturing industry however, does not tell the 
whole story.161 What O’Neil is missing is that 76 percent of manufactured products come 
from IMMEX corporations, which Cypher has labeled as mostly maquiladoras and 
disguised maquiladoras and are the source of the labor-export led model that Cypher and 
Delgado Wise claim to be deindustrializing Mexico.162  
D. APPLYING THE FIVE THEORIES OF DEINDUSTRIALIZATION 
With a foundational history of Mexico’s policies, the five theories of 
deindustrialization may now be applied to the case study in order to determine what 
issues (if any) are contributing to the deindustrialization of Mexico.  
1. Technology 
The first theory that can be applied to the Mexican case is Palma’s theory that 
advancements in technology can result in decreases in the manufacturing industry. 163 
While this theory primarily assumes that advances in technology reduce the demand for 
manual labor in manufacturing, thus leading to de-industrialization, some aspects can be 
applied to Mexico. Gerardo Esquivel and José Antonio Rodríguez-López’s wage gap 
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argument places blame on advancements of technology in the manufacturing sector, since 
the inception of NAFTA, for a failure to close the wage gap. In this scenario, in addition 
to technology directly taking the place of human workers, the advanced equipment being 
used in manufacturing also demands more skilled labor. The result is a reduction in the 
demand for unskilled labor, which affects a large majority of the Mexican work force. 
While some similarities are present, advancements in technology are only a part of 
Mexico’s economic problem; therefore, it is unlikely that this theory is the main driving 
force for any deindustrialization in the country.  
2. Currency 
The second theory that deindustrialization is a currency-driven phenomenon 
relates closely to the Mexican situation. Rowthorn and Ramaswamy reveal that large 
increases in exchange rates can cause a country to lose manufacturing jobs.164 The 
phenomenon is analogous to Rahman, Foshee, and Mustafa’s argument that the exchange 
rate policy is creating a decrease in tradable goods as a result of increased remittances; 
however, similar to the theory of advanced technology, this theory does not provide a 
complete explanation for Mexico’s situation as the theory only exhibits some similarities 
with the state’s economic problems. Additionally, all circumstances of deindustrialization 
inevitably have some degree of exchange rate fluctuation, making this theory a useful 
tool to help describe the phenomenon, but does not serve as a sole cause. 
3. Outsourcing 
The third hypothesis refers to Petras’ new international division of labor and 
outsourcing as the origins of manufacturing decline. The theory is based on the idea that 
cheap labor-intensive manufacturing decreases in industrializing countries once less 
expensive alternatives to manufacturing are discovered; cheap imports increase and 
manufacturing within the country decreases.165 This theory applies directly to the 
maquiladora industry, but in a non-traditional sense. As the maquila parent corporations 
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continuously seek to lower production costs and take advantage of tax free areas and 
government subsidies, more and more of the equipment and materials required for 
production are shipped into the facilities. The increase of imports takes a toll on domestic 
suppliers and many are eventually forced out of business. While production of exports 
continues to boom for the maquilas, only a small portion of each corporation’s profits are 
pumped back into the Mexican economy, most of which are in the form of worker’s 
wages. Most traditional cases of this theory are strictly issues of outsourcing and supply 
and demand; however, the maquiladora industry is unique to Mexico and has created a 
disguised version of this theory that is only affecting domestic manufacturing production 
while internationally controlled manufacturing thrives and continues to attract more FDI.  
4. North-South Relationships 
The fourth theory overlaps with the Petras’ argument. Former Brazilian minister 
of finance, Luis Carlos Bresser-Pereira views one cause for deindustrialization as the 
result of an imbalance in North-South relationships where the larger country in the 
relationship causes regressive specialization to occur in the smaller economy.166 
Mexico’s relationship with the United States has undoubtedly created some semblance of 
regressive specialization within the Mexican economy. What makes Mexico’s case 
different though is where a standard example of regressive specialization would normally 
look like a country focusing a majority of its manufacturing efforts into producing a 
specific product, Mexico’s regressive specialization is in low-skill labor. Delgado-Wise 
and Márquez’s argument that the maquiladora industry has created a labor export-led 
economy aligns with Bresser-Pereira’s North-South regressive specialization theory.167 
The Maquiladora industry creates a situation where U.S. corporations continue to 
increase profits while unskilled Mexican workers are exploited for minimal wages, thus 
trapping Mexico in an economic cycle of dependency with a workforce of low-skill 
laborers.  
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5. “Dutch Disease” 
The final theory to apply to Mexico is the resource curse, or “Dutch disease.” 
While it appears that in the past, Mexico has encountered some brushes with the resource 
curse in the form of oil exports, recent reforms bring hope that the government will be 
less dependent on the commodity in the near future. Oil revenues currently play a large 
role in government spending, accounting for 34 percent of the budget in 2013, but the 
new policies should correct for the errors of the past and optimistically reduce 
government dependency on oil revenues to only 27 percent of the budget by 2018.168 The 
other argument for “Dutch disease” is centered on the positions of Rahman, Foshee, and 
Mustafa regarding remittances. The case for a remittance curse is best paired with the 
currency-based deindustrialization theory; the two arguments combined, increasing 
remittances and poor exchange rate policy, make a debatable case for deindustrialization 
in Mexico.  
E. CONCLUSION 
A close examination of past economic and political policies, and a look at the 
effects of NAFTA on the economy has revealed that Mexico has followed a different 
trajectory than Brazil since neoliberal reforms. Despite the differences, some suggest that 
Mexico is encountering signs of premature deindustrialization, but for different reasons 
than Brazil experienced. Applying the theories of deindustrialization to the Mexican case 
reveals that there is not a specific example that clearly demonstrates a textbook 
illustration of the phenomenon; instead, the study presents a situation of disguised 
deindustrialization using a combination of regressive specialization and a remittance-
driven resource curse. Overall, the circumstances in both Brazil and Mexico are subtle; 
each country is experiencing different forms of premature deindustrialization, which 
provides an area for further research as a possible cause of stagnation in each economy.  
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V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has highlighted two cases of deindustrialization that have afflicted 
Brazil and Mexico; one is a clear case of the resource curse, while the other is a much 
less obvious case of disguised deindustrialization seen in labor exports and remittances. 
The cases are only two examples of how deindustrialization can take hold of an economy, 
and conceivably add to overall economic stagnation.  This chapter looks at the two cases 
of Mexico and Brazil and compares the two countries’ paths since neo-liberal reforms 
and the deindustrializing properties associated with each state. The chapter concludes 
with a few lessons learned from each situation that could assist developing nations in 
avoiding similar pitfalls that Mexico and Brazil experienced. 
A. TWO WAYS TO GLOBALIZE 
Mexico and Brazil took dissimilar approaches to globalization, resulting in easily 
recognizable economic variations between the two states. Brazil developed a restricted 
approach to economic growth, causing the state to be one of the least open economies in 
Latin America.169 Mexico exhibited full openness to free trade agreements while 
displaying a complementary economy to the United States; as a result, Mexico is “the 
most open of the world’s leading economies.”170 In the World Bank’s Doing Business 
2013 report, Mexico ranked 43rd in the world for ease of doing business, while Brazil 
came in at 130th out of 185 countries.171 To understand why there is such divergence in 
economic performance, it is helpful to turn to the countries’ paths of development.  
There are three contributing factors that can explain the varying economic 
development; Peter Hakim writes that geography, domestic politics, and national 
ideology each account for what made the two states pursue contradictory agendas in their 
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quests for open economies.172 Geographic influence to economic policies is the first 
example of how Mexico and Brazil differed in pursuing globalization. The commercial 
center of Brazil is physically separated from most neighboring countries by the Amazon 
Jungle, isolating the majority of the population on the Grand Escarpment along the 
Atlantic coast, which constrains economic expansion and challenges advancements in 
infrastructure.173 Ranking 7th in world economies for annual GDP, Brazil is the major 
economic power in the South America, and it leads by a long shot; the next closest-
ranking economy is Argentina, which brings in less than a third of Brazil’s GDP, ranking 
21st in the world.174 The United States is the only economic power that outranks Brazil in 
the Western Hemisphere, and with 2,400 miles between the two countries, it is arguable 
that geography played a significant role in Brazil’s isolative tendencies for protective 
trade agreements while seeking regional leadership.175 
Mexico exhibits quite a different scenario; the country “sits in the shadow of the 
world’s richest and most powerful nation,” and has coastal access to the Pacific Ocean 
and the Gulf of Mexico.176 Such ample access to global markets helped Mexico to 
implement a fully open economy with a multitude of FTAs, including complete 
immersion in the U.S. economy through NAFTA. Mexico’s alignment with the U.S. 
economy has led to complementary market fluctuations between the two neighbors.177 
Despite Mexico’s access to world markets and exclusive relationship with the United 
States, the country ranks behind Brazil in GDP with the 15th largest economy in the 
world, bringing in the equivalent of about 50 percent of Brazil’s annual GDP.178 
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Domestic politics may have a greater effect on each state’s path than geopolitics. 
Brazil’s long history of oligarchic tendencies has created a state that is not only difficult 
to conduct business with, but has also created a disorganized political system with a 
restrictive constitution.179 Policies that Brazil has adopted, such as the Plano Real, aim to 
stabilize the economy, limiting inflation and thereby also limiting growth. Such policies 
promote protectionist ideals, limiting trade volume and drawing the government’s focus 
toward remedying domestic economic issues, while paying less attention to international 
objectives.180 This could help explain why Brazil has taken a less open approach toward 
trade agreements than Mexico. 
In contrast to Brazil, Mexico’s government during neo-liberal reforms was more 
centralized with less sway from populist politics. In the early 1990s, Mexico shifted from 
a protective stance against the United States, to embracing an economic alliance with the 
global giant. The policy shift opened the doors of Mexico to free trade. Hakim writes that 
Mexico’s decisions were “based on technocratic judgments, without serious opposition 
from Mexico’s congress, labor unions, or the press.”181 The Mexico of today is more 
democratic than when Salinas brought about economic reforms, but those domestic 
political decisions of the early 1990s guided Mexico to become a world leader in free 
trade today. Currently, Mexico is active in 12 agreements between 44 countries, and just 
within the last year, expanded the list by becoming a member of the Pacific Alliance.182  
Much like the governing bodies, the national ideologies of Brazil and Mexico are 
also vastly different with respect to global aspirations. Brazil’s interests lay in avoiding 
“any semblance of submissive compliance to the United States.”183 The South American 
giant views itself as a major world power and continually seeks global recognition as 
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seen in attempts to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, 
Directorship-General of the WTO, and presidency of Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB).184 The country also seeks global recognition of its economic strength by engaging 
in South-South partnerships such as BRICS and MERCOSUR, and has been eager to 
show the world its military capabilities as seen when Brazil took the lead in the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).185 The country has focused efforts on 
global goals without first attaining respect as a regional leader; Brazil’s somewhat erratic 
attempts to earn regional respect have caused neighboring states to act against Brazil in 
fear of the giant gaining regional superiority.186  
Mexico’s national ideologies have resulted in foreign policy that is far less 
ambitious than Brazil’s.187 Ana Covarrubias contends that for Mexico, “an active role in 
the international system was not a priority.188 For Mexico, the relationship with the U.S. 
has created an ideology of “intermestic” consciousness, focusing on not allowing U.S. 
economy dependency to interfere with other aspects of Mexican national interest.189 The 
unique relationship led Mexico to develop a foreign policy with sentiments of an 
“agreement to disagree” with the United States in order to avoid serious confrontations in 
the bilateral relationship, while simultaneously protecting national interests.190 While the 
bilateral agreement does loom large, Mexico’s ideologies have not been completely 
immersed with the U.S.; the country has also sought to serve as a “bridge between North 
and South America,” actively engaging in Central American issues such as infrastructure 
development, and advocating human rights and democracy.191 
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B. DIFFERENT, YET SIMILAR 
Comparing the vast differences in the economic growth of Brazil and Mexico 
make it easy to overlook that the two states came from similar backgrounds. The 
successful growth rates of both countries throughout much of the 20th century gave way 
to debt burdens and recessions in the 1980s. Each state then initiated economic reforms 
that aligned with the “Washington Consensus” of “fiscal discipline, privatization of state-
owned businesses, and foreign trade liberalization.”192 From there, the paths split (as 
outlined earlier in this chapter); however, the two states continue to share a similarity—
economic stagnation. While Brazil and Mexico confront their own individual economic 
issues, they display two separate types of deindustrialization that could be a contributing 
source to the less-than-expected performance of their economies. The remainder of this 
chapter will compare the differences in the phenomenon that each state is encountering, 
and attempt to highlight key points that developing nations could learn from. 
C. TWO WAYS TO DEINDUSTRIALIZE 
The second chapter of this thesis reveals that there are multiple causes of 
premature deindustrialization that can lead to economic stagnation. The five studied 
causes reveal that premature deindustrialization can occur as the result of 1) insufficient 
technology in the industrial sector 2) currency based problems in the economy 3) 
outsourcing of labor 4) North-South relationships 5) the resource curse, or “Dutch 
disease.” The focus of this thesis is on two case studies with differing causes of the 
phenomenon. Research shows that Brazil is experiencing a form of “Dutch disease” due 
to the country’s focus on natural resource exports, while Mexico is encountering a 
disguised version of deindustrialization created from a unique combination of labor-led 
regressive specialization, and a remittance based resource curse. Although these studies 
do not provide an all-inclusive look into all potential causes of deindustrialization, the 
examples tell the story of the two largest economies in Latin America; therefore, the case 
studies serve as illustrations for other developing states in the region and are 
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comparatively reviewed here for the purpose of highlighting potential developmental 
pitfalls.  
Chapter three reveals that Brazil suffers from a lack of technology in the 
manufacturing sector, overvalued currency in the economy, outsourcing to the Chinese 
economy, and regressive specialization of natural resource exports. Although all of these 
problems can lead to deindustrialization in a country, the prominent source of Brazil’s 
premature deindustrialization is a resource curse. Traditional cases of the resource curse 
usually involve one commodity, typically oil, which becomes an economy’s main export, 
causing a decline in the manufacturing industry. Brazil’s case is a non-typical example 
because the problem is spread out over the export of many natural resources.  
In Chapter four, the case for premature deindustrialization in Mexico is subtle, but 
present. The country suffers from a large wage gap, troubled exchange rate policy, and is 
on the lesser side of a North-South relationship; however, these problems do not solely 
account for Mexico’s deindustrialization. The source of Mexico’s troubles are linked to 
regressive specialization that has created a labor-export led economy, and remittances 
that have a similar effect of a resource curse. Mexico’s case of deindustrialization is a 
non-standard example; where normal cases show the decline of the entire manufacturing 
industry, Mexico’s case only applies to the national manufacturing industry. Trade 
agreements with the U.S. create a unique situation of the Maquiladora industry and as a 
result Mexico’s international manufacturing industry is one of the leading exporters in 
Latin America. The nature of the Maquiladora industry though, has reduced dependency 
on domestic manufacturing as imported goods and machinery are used in the factories 
that produce Mexico’s manufactured exports. The result is a decrease in domestic 
manufacturing businesses and an increase in low skilled labor at the Maquiladoras. In 
addition to this problem, remittances from the U.S. have strengthened the Peso, which in 
turn reduces demand for labor, appreciates the exchange rate, and reduces export activity 
of tradable goods. The effects are similar to that of a resource curse. 
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D. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
Developing countries can benefit from the experiences that Brazil and Mexico 
have encountered. While it is unlikely that developing states in Latin America will 
achieve the same economic stature and global recognition that Brazil and Mexico have, it 
is useful to understand how each county’s path to a globalized economy led to situations 
that spawned premature deindustrialization. Being able to recognize pitfalls could assist 
developing states in avoiding a fate similar to Brazil and Mexico and possibly spare 
potential economic stagnation.  
Brazil’s path to a globalized economy has been hindered by aspirations of 
regional and global recognition. The constant struggle to attain regional leadership, while 
avoiding any U.S. dependency, has caused Brazil to follow a relatively protectionist 
strategy and to engage in South-South trade partnerships.193 Brazil’s problems are also 
exacerbated by geographical constraints on industrial growth. The terrain of the Grand 
Escarpment makes it difficult to integrate local infrastructure, leading to bottlenecked 
economic growth.194 The restricted industrial growth (combined with Brazil’s trade 
relationships with resource hungry nations like China) has left Brazil with “little choice 
but to focus on the production and extraction of primary commodities.”195 Ultimately, 
these events have caused Brazil to encounter a resource curse that has endangered the 
economy with premature deindustrialization. Other developing states could learn from 
Brazil that restrictive trade policies, combined with economy-restricting geographic 
features, can result in the state being tunneled into a non-sustainable export strategy.  
Mexico’s situation also holds valuable lessons for developing states. Mexico’s 
open market strategy is a compelling example of how to conduct business; but small 
economies should exercise caution. Entering into a relationship with a large economy, 
like the U.S., can open up many opportunities for growth in a developing nation. Mexico 
has benefited from NAFTA, but the Maquiladora industry has hamstrung Mexico’s 
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manufacturing industry, forcing a dependency on the United States, specifically in areas 
of foreign investment and international corporations. The toll is seen in the decline of 
domestic manufacturing, a lack of skilled labor, and increased remittances. Developing 
countries should be wary of entering into North-South relationships so as not to get 
caught in a trap of dependency, which can lead to premature deindustrialization and 
economic stagnation. 
For a country to avoid deindustrialization (before its economy is prepared to 
endure the process), the key is awareness and early recognition of the warning signs. 
Learning from other countries’ misfortunes is a valuable tool in determining the early 
signals of economic stagnation. A situation like Brazil’s is a difficult one to avoid, but 
with early recognition, steps to correct the problem can be implemented. Following the 
advice of Bresser-Pereira (as detailed in chapter three) could help a country with “Dutch 
disease” to reverse the process and restore prosperity to the manufacturing industry. 
Mexico’s issues are not as easy to fix; the uniqueness of the maquiladora industry does 
however, provide a good example of potential dangers of dependency. Additionally, 
many Latin American states depend on remittances to enhance their economy; such states 
are not likely to have a manufacturing industry as robust as Mexico’s and therefore 
should realize that their economies could be more susceptible to a remittance curse.  
The possibility that premature deindustrialization can lead to economic stagnation 
is real and this thesis has argued that Brazil and Mexico have both suffered from the 
phenomenon. A series of definitions and five theoretical causes of deindustrialization 
have created a foundational knowledge of the topic, but this study has shown that each 
occurrence is unique to the country experiencing it, and can be the result of many factors. 
Further research in the Brazil and Mexico cases would not only help to bring recognition 
to the situations in both countries, but could also assist in the correction of their 
problems, and provide valuable guidance for other developing Latin American 
economies.  
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